The Heisenberg Defense: Proactively Defending SGX Enclaves against
  Page-Table-Based Side-Channel Attacks by Strackx, Raoul & Piessens, Frank
The Heisenberg Defense: Proactively Defending SGX Enclaves
against Page-Table-Based Side-Channel Attacks
Raoul Strackx
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
raoul.strackx@cs.kuleuven.be
Frank Piessens
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
frank.piessens@cs.kuleuven.be
ABSTRACT
Protected-module architectures (PMAs) have been proposed to
provide strong isolation guarantees, even on top of a compromised
system. Unfortunately, Intel SGX – the only publicly available high-
end PMA – has been shown to only provide limited isolation. An
attacker controlling the untrusted page tables, can learn enclave
secrets by observing its page access patterns.
Fortifying existing protected-module architectures in a real-
world setting against side-channel attacks is an extremely difficult
task as system software (hypervisor, operating system, . . . ) needs
to remain in full control over the underlying hardware. Most state-
of-the-art solutions propose a reactive defense that monitors for
signs of an attack. Such approaches unfortunately cannot detect
the most novel attacks, suffer from false-positives, and place an
extraordinary heavy burden on enclave-developers when an attack
is detected.
We present Heisenberg, a proactive defense that provides com-
plete protection against page table based side channels. We guar-
antee that any attack will either be prevented or detected auto-
matically before any sensitive information leaks. Consequently,
Heisenberg can always securely resume enclave execution – even
when the attacker is still present in the system.
We present two implementations. Heisenberg-HW relies on very
limited hardware features to defend against page-table-based at-
tacks. We use the x86/SGX platform as an example, but the same
approach can be applied when protected-module architectures are
ported to different platforms as well.
Heisenberg-SW avoids these hardware modifications and can
readily be applied. Unfortunately, it’s reliance on Intel Transac-
tional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) may lead to significant
performance overhead under real-life conditions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Hardware security solutions such as smart cards and one-time
password (OTP) generators are generally considered more secure
than their software-based implementations. Being physically sepa-
rate devices with only a very limited physical interface without a
network connection, they are virtually immune to malware. Unfor-
tunately, they also have significant disadvantages: they are much
more expensive than software, are difficult to replace in case of
loss or theft, and most devices are tight to only one specific service
leading to a proliferation of devices a user needs to carry along.
Protected-module architectures (PMAs) [4, 7, 8, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21,
34, 38, 39, 43, 45, 52, 53, 55] have been proposed to bridge this gap.
Such architectures enable small, mutually distrusting, “protected
modules” to be isolated from large – potentially compromised –
applications, operating systems and even more privileged layers.
Such modules can only be called through specific entry points. Any
other access attempt to these memory regions is prevented. Services
provided by legacy operating systems and hypervisors are still used,
but an attacker at this level should not be able to affect the security
of protected modules.
Early designs of PMAs leveraged their small trusted computing
base (TCB) to provide strong protection of security-sensitive “Pieces
of Application Logic” (PALs) [39, 40], or enable a software version of
existing hardware-based security solutions [10, 29, 35, 44]. Security
of these modules is paramount. Hence, these modules tend to have
a small codebase to make formal verification a reasonable option.
With the arrival of Intel SGX – an Intel-implemented PMA –
a second research track emerged that aims to protect users from
malicious cloud providers [5]. By relying on SGX’ guarantee that
protected “enclaves” never reside in plaintext outside the CPU pack-
age, even an attacker with physical access cannot directly extract
sensitive data. TCB reduction and formally verifiable security is
less importance than ease of use. Prototypes have been developed
that protect complete applications [5, 57] or containers [3].
Protected-module architectures rely on a delicate balance of
responsibility between system software (e.g, kernel, hypervisor,
. . . ) and the modules that execute on the device. On one hand the
PMA needs to ensure that modules execute in complete isolation
and can provide strong security guarantees. But on the other, it is
paramount that privileged system software remains in full control
over the platform. A malicious or buggy protected module, for
example, must not be able to make the system non-responsive by
entering an infinite loop. Hence Intel SGX [1, 29, 41] ensures that
its protected “enclaves” can be interrupted at any moment in time.
A similar but much harder problem to solve arises in the memory
allocation mechanism of SGX enclaves. To prevent that badly behav-
ing enclaves negatively affect the overall system, system software
should remain in control over SGX reserved memory allocation.
SGX fulfills this requirement by enabling privileged software to
swap enclave pages in and out of memory. Confidentiality, integrity
and freshness of these pages is guaranteed directly by hardware.
Unfortunately, this enables powerful side-channel attacks [12,
62]. An executing enclave that attempts to access a page that is no
longer in memory, will cause a page fault. It is up to the kernel to
swap the required page back in, and resume the enclave. In order
to do so, the address of the memory page needs to be provided. By
carefully swapping specific pages out of enclave memory, sensitive
information about the inner state of the enclave can be learned.
Existing security measures are split in two lines of research. One
line focuses on the detection of an ongoing attack. Shih et al. [50]
present in their NDSS’17 paper a solution to intercept page faults.
Chen et al. [14] detect unexpected enclave exits through a trusted
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timing thread. While stopping the attacks described by Xu et al.,
enclave accesses are disclosed in other ways as well (e.g., accessed
and dirty bits set in the untrusted page) tables [12, 17, 18, 59].
Another line of research relies on heavy code transformations.
Shinde et al. [51] proposes to add dummy instructions and a scratch
pad to ensure that all execution paths lead to identical memory
access patterns. Programmer support is required to reduce overhead
and non-balanced execution paths are not supported. Similarly,
advice by Intel [33] to align code and data to a single page, or by
the cryptographic community to avoid sensitive data-dependent
memory-accesses are very hard to enforce in practice. Even in
widely-used, hardened cryptographic libraries, such side-channels
are present. [51]
We propose Heisenberg, a proactive defense providing com-
plete protection against page-table based side channels for enclaved
security-sensitive pieces of application logic. By preloading enclave
page addresses in the TLB upon enclave (re-)entry, an attacker
is no longer able to observe enclave page accesses. During an at-
tack either the adversary can no longer detect which pages were
accessed, or enclaves exit automatically and immediately.1 As no
information about an enclave’s memory accesses ever flows to an
attacker, enclaves can always be restarted securely, even when an
attacker may subsequently continue her attack. This avoids the
significant shortcomings of state-of-the-art reactive approaches
(see Section 2.3).
We make the following contributions:
• We propose a proactive defense mechanism for protected
modules that require complete protection against page-table-
based side-channel attacks.
• Our Heisenberg-HW prototype enables a framework to de-
fend against many side-channel attacks (e.g., cache attacks).
It relies only on small hardwaremodifications that are limited
to the implementation of the protected-module architecture
and has a very limited performance overhead.
• For readily available platforms, we present Heisenberg-SW,
a prototype relying on Intel’s Transactional Synchronization
Extensions (TSX).
• We investigate the use of Intel TSX as a defense mechanism
to hook SGX enclave resumes and show that the transaction
abort rate can increase up to two orders of magnitude when
the system comes under heavy load, even when transac-
tions are running on a reserved physical core and interrupts
are offloaded to a different core. This impacts all defense
mechanisms [50] – including Heisenberg-SW – that take
this approach. Our proposed hardware modifications avoid
such limitations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
describes how page-table based attacks operate and state which
security and operational guarantees solutions need to provide if
they are ever to be applied outside the lab. Our Heisenberg defense
and its two variations are presented in Section 3. Sections 4 and
5 discuss and evaluate our two implementations. We discuss the
impact of enclave size on page-table-based side channels in general
and our defense in detail in Section 6. Finally we discuss related
1Given the similarity to quantum physics where the location and momentum of
particles cannot be determined at the same time, we call this the Heisenberg defense.
Figure 1: Basic example of a page-table based side channel
attack. The occurrence (or absence) of a page fault after an
attacker evicted the add_description_xyz function reveals
the result of the DNA analysis.
work and conclude in Sections 7 and 8.We refer readers with limited
knowledge of Intel SGX to appendix A.
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
SGX leaves system software in full control over virtual address space
translations and allocation of SGX reserved memory. Unfortunately,
Xu et al. [62] showed that this enables powerful side channels
against enclaves. In Section 2.1 we discuss their attack in a very
basic form and elaborate on closely related attacks using alternative
information leaks. Next, we more precisely define the attack model
we need to defend against. Finally in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 we discuss
Heisenberg’s security properties and how any practical solution
to the page-table-based side channel problem needs to ensure that
system software is able to manage the platform effectively.
2.1 Page-Table-Based Side-Channels
Basic Attack. Consider as an example the code shown in Figure 1
that detects and reports the presence of specific mutations in a
patient’s genome. To ensure the confidentiality of patients’ medical
records, the analysis is placed in an enclave.
In the most basic form of the attack, the page containing the
add_description_xyz function is evicted fromEPCmemory.When
during enclave execution a page fault is raised, the function was
called and the attacker learns that the patient suffers from the
specific disorder. Note that also the absence of a page fault leaks
information about the patient’s health.
This very basic example assumes that the add_description_xyz
function is located on an otherwise unused page. Such requirements
can be eliminated [62] when key locations of the enclave’s call graph
are evicted.
Closely-related Attack Vectors. At Usenix’17 [12] and CCS’17 [59]
even more subtle attacks were demonstrated:
• An enclave page in EPC memory but marked non-present
in the page tables will also lead to a page fault. [60, 62]
• Writing to an enclave page marked non-writable in the page
table leads to a page fault, even when EPCM metadata indi-
cates write privileges. Revoking execution rights from code
pages leads to similar events.
• Accessed and dirty bits are still recorded in the page tables
for EPC memory [12, 17, 59].
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• Page table entries are also placed in the data cache when
they are accessed. Hence, an attacker monitoring the cache
can detect when the page table is walked and which enclave
page is accessed. [12, 25, 59]
Especially these last two attacks are hard to defend against as
they can be executed concurrently from another logical corewithout
causing an enclave exit. This significantly reduces the effectiveness
of state-of-the-art defenses [14, 50].
2.2 Attack Model
To provide strong protection against the various ways enclave-page
accesses are revealed, we assume a strong attack model where an
attacker can (1) observe all page table walks in enclavemodewithout
interrupting the enclave’s execution [12, 59] and (2) interrupt an
enclave precisely at instruction-level granularity [12, 27].
Although other side channels exist that threaten the confiden-
tiality of enclave execution [36], we consider those to be out of
scope. In particular, we do not consider cache-attacks [9, 24, 42, 47]
against EPC memory. This is an orthogonal problem. Any protec-
tion against an attacker probing an enclave’s cache, still needs to
consider the possibility that enclave pages may be evicted from
EPC memory and its page tables manipulated or observed.
2.3 Security Guarantees
Most state-of-the-art solutions that protect SGX enclaves against
page-table-based side channels are reactive security measures. They
try to detect when the enclave is under attack based on unusual
numbers of discontinued code execution [50] or time taken to exe-
cute security sensitive code [14]. Such approaches are suboptimal as
(1) novel attacks do not cause enclave exits and cannot be observed
from the enclave itself [12], (2) the absence of page faults may also
leak sensitive information to an attacker (see Section 2.1) and (3)
enclaves when not under attack may also experience page faults
(e.g., a benign OS paged out an enclave page) and interrupts (e.g.,
an external interrupt needs to be handled). Hence it is challenging
for enclave developers to specify a threshold of enclave exits that
balances the likelihood that attacks are being stopped with a low
number of false-positives (see Appendix B). (4) Reactive defenses
require special security policies [14, 50] to ensure that after the
detection of an attack, enclaves can be restarted securely. Attackers
must not be able to launch attacks against different instances of the
same enclave and aggregate the information learned from each indi-
vidual attack. This is important especially in server settings where
services should always be up and running. Moreover, while cryp-
tographic keys can often be re-negotiated [14], it remains unclear
how security policies can prevent attacks against the sensitive data
itself that an enclave processes (e.g., the genome data in Section 2.1).
Heisenberg in contrast takes a completely different approach that
avoids these shortcomings. Instead of detecting an ongoing attack,
we proactively take security measures to ensure that any attack
against the enclave will either be detected before any confidential
data is processed, or fail to observe enclave page accesses. An
enclave protected with Heisenberg will thus never leak even a
single bit of information about its internal state to an attacker
through its page accesses. Hence, there is no need to differentiate
benign from malicious interrupts; enclaves may always be resumed.
2.4 Operational Guarantees for System
Software and Enclaves
Any solution to the page-table-based side channel problem, needs
to ensure that all operational properties of system software and
enclaves can still be guaranteed.
First, it is paramount that system software remains in full control
over all system resources, including EPC memory. The operating
system and virtual machine monitor (VMM) must be able to ef-
ficiently and fairly multiplex EPC memory. This implies that (1)
enclave pages must always be able to be evicted from EPC mem-
ory, (2) the hardware should aid the EPC multiplexer to pick good
EPC page candidates to be evicted [18], for example through the
accessed/dirty bit mechanism in its page tables and (3) enclaves
should not be able to hold a lock on EPC memory [51] nor the
CPU (i.e., interrupts should not be disabled [58]). This is especially
challenging in a cloud setting as EPC resource allocation by the
VMM should also be transparent to the virtual machine’s OS manag-
ing the same resource. Complex negotiation mechanisms between
enclave and system software are an intractable solution.
Second, when the system is not under attack, correctly-written
enclaves should never end up in a state where they cannot advance.
3 THE HEISENBERG DEFENSE
Earlier designs of protected-module architectures have been imple-
mented through a more privileged software layer such as a hyper-
visor [38, 55] or system management mode (SMM) [4]. Whenever
a context switch is performed between the untrusted context and
the protected module, this privileged layer enforces the memory ac-
cess control mechanism. This is also a prime location to implement
defenses against various types of side channels. Hypervisor-based
architectures for example could virtualize EPC memory and com-
pletely hide page faults from the untrusted virtual machine, foiling
Xu et al.’s attack [62].
Intel SGX provides very similar features. Unfortunately as they
are implemented almost completely in microcode [17], their flexi-
bility is limited. Virtualizing EPC memory through microcode, for
example, is infeasible as this implies accessing disk space.
We propose a generic approach to bridge this gap between
HW/SW-based approaches. Instead of a more privileged layer im-
plementing defenses against side-channels, we enable SGX enclaves
to implement defensive measures upon enclave entry/re-entry. This
has the advantage that enclaves can use detailed information about
their own implementation to reduce overhead.
To implement this approach, two requirements need to be met:
Requirement 1:Hookable security code: An SGX enclave should
always be able to execute defensive code inside the enclave before
confidential data is processed. Upon enclave entry this is trivial
as enclaves always enter at a fixed set of locations. Enclave reen-
tries on the other hand pose technical challenges as SGX does not
natively support intercepting their execution.
Requirement 2: Unobservable enclaved execution: After the
defensive code finished execution, the enclave’s behavior must
not be observable by an attacker. This cloaking must be done pro-
actively as operational guarantees prevents us from (temporarily)
disabling or postponing interrupt handling.
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Figure 2: An attacker is prevented from observing memory
access patterns by intercepting all enclave (re-)entries and
pre-loading the TLB before sensitive data is processed.
In Section 3.1 we present our basic defense strategy. Heisenberg-
HW (Section 3.2) provides complete protection at the cost of only
very limited hardware modifications. Heisenberg-SW (Section 3.3)
on the other hand can be applied on readily available platforms, but
the use of Intel TSX makes performance overhead hard to estimate.
3.1 Heisenberg’s Basic Defense Mechanism
Consider an SGX enclave implementing a one-time password gen-
erator [29]. Figure 2 displays our approach graphically. When the
enclave is entered or resumed, we intercept the control flow. For
every enclave page whose accesses may be of interest to an attacker,
we load its address translation in the TLB. Only afterwards code to
generate the next password is executed. An attacker may monitor
the page tables, but she will only observe pre-determined page
accesses by our proactive loading scheme. During password gener-
ation, address translations are already present in the TLB and no
sensitive information leaks. Interrupting the enclavewould flush the
TLB, but the hooked libheisenberg-sw/hw library would again
pre-load the TLB before resuming the actual password generator.
To avoid all page table accesses and page faults during OTP
generation, we issue dummy instructions. First, we verify that the
enclave page is present in EPC memory, marked present in the page
tables and has the proper access rights. For read-only enclave pages,
it is sufficient to issue simple read instructions to these pages. For
writable pages we verify write access by reading and re-writing a
single memory location. Executable enclave pages are first searched
for a return instruction and subsequently called.
Second, we ensure that during OTP generation, page table en-
tries are no longer accessed to set accessed and dirty bits. As the
page table is walked only when access to the page is requested,
the accessed bit is set immediately. Accessed bits are not stored
explicitly in the TLB; entries themselves indicate that the bit is
already set. The value of the dirty bit on the other hand is cached in
the TLB and set upon the first time a write is issued. Both accessed
and dirty bits are set only once. An attacker clearing the bit from
another core without flushing the TLB, will not cause additional
page table walks. [32]
Finally we ensure that an attacker cannot evict a TLB entry
during the execution of security-sensitive code. This is handled
differently depending on whether we rely on hardware modifica-
tions. We discuss TLB and EPC memory size-constraints in detail
in Section 6.
3.2 Heisenberg-HW: Pro-Active Code with
Limited Hardware Modifications
When considering hardware modifications to increase security, two
research directions exists. First, one could reconsider the complete
platform architecture and design an inherently more secure plat-
form. This is interesting from a research perspective and valuable
for new real-world products, but it is unlikely that existing plat-
forms will adopt these changes. Hardware vendors need to remain
backwards compatible with previous platform generations and new
features will need to be supported almost indefinitely.
We choose the other approach: bringing the desired features to
the platform with only very limited, local changes. These changes
are much less likely to affect existing software and are much more
likely to be added to existing platforms.
3.2.1 Requirement 1: Hooking libheisenberg-HW. Our first re-
quirement is to guarantee that pro-active security code will always
be called within the enclave upon every enclave (re-)entry. This is
non-trivial as naive implementations may cause enclaves to enter a
stuck state, even under benign conditions.
Operational Considerations. At design-time enclave writers need
to reserve a fixed stack of SSA frames. When an enclave is inter-
rupted, the top SSA frame is used to store the current state of the
processor. enclu[eresume]s simply pop the top SSA frame and
resume execution. The enclu[eenter] instruction on the other
hand checks that at least one slot is still available on the stack,
should the enclave call be interrupted.
A stack of SSA frames is needed when enclaves internally may
cause a fault that cannot be handled by system software (e.g., div-by-
zero). In such situations another entry point can be enclu[eenter]’d
to resolve the fault. Afterwards the in-enclave fault handler exits the
enclave and the subsequent enclu[eresume] resumes execution
using the modified enclave context.
The question that now arises is how big the SSA stack should
be. When enclave resumes would be handled in software, these
functions themselves could be interrupted before the SSA stack
is popped, and this ad infinitum. This would quickly consume all
available SSA frames, prevent enclu[eenter] instructions from
succeeding and thus leaving the enclave in a stuck state. By pro-
viding a hardware mechanism that handles resume-from-interrupt
as an atomic enclu[eresume] instruction, SGX guarantees that
under benign events correctly-written enclaves will never end up
in a state where they cannot advance.
Limited Hardware Modifications. To provide hardware support
to hook interrupts without limiting SGX’ operational guarantees,
we advocate an approach similar to the way faults are handled. We
propose the implementation of a block-eresume bit in SSA frames.
Enclave writers who need to intercept interrupts, can set this bit in
the SSA frame on top of the SSA stack; the SSA frame that will be
used to store the enclave’s state upon the next interrupt.
When an enclu[eresume] is issued to resume an enclave, the
block-eresume bit of the SSA frame to be resumed from is checked.
When the bit is clear (the default), the enclave resumes execution
as usual. When this bit is set however, the enclu[eresume]’s fails.
Similar to faults, the surrounding application must first call an in-
terrupt handler within the enclave to reset the enclu[eresume] bit.
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As the enclave context (i.e., the SSA frame) used to be resume exe-
cution from can be modified as well at this point, enclu[eresume]
instructions can be hooked .
Hooking Pro-Active Code with HW Support. With these hard-
ware changes, it is straightforward to force the execution of a
resume_hook function before an enclave resumes its normal oper-
ation. Listing 1 displays the algorithm. When the ecall_gen_otp
enclave entry point is called, we signal that future enclave inter-
rupts need to be blocked (line 7). Next, proactive_security_code
is called which will (eventually) pre-load the required TLB entries.
Finally the gen_otp function is executed protected from page-table-
based side channels and we clear the block_eresume bit and exit
the enclave.
When an interrupt arrives when the block-eresume bit has been
set, it can only be resumed again after its interrupt_handler was
called. Here the enclave’s context (i.e., it’s SSA frame) is temporarily
stored in a global variable (line 23). Next, the SSA frame is over-
written with an artificial hook_context to redirect execution to
the resume_hook function and finally the SSA’s block_eresume
bit is cleared. For clarity we postpone the discuss the meaning of
the condition test on line 22.
When a enclu[eresume] instruction is now issued, the enclave
resumes execution from the the hook_context. Again we ensure
that all interruptswill force the execution of the interrupt_handler
and execute proactive_security_code. Finally we resume the en-
clave state.
A subtle difficulty arises when we consider interrupts arriv-
ing while the resume_hook is being executed. Following the same
principle we could hook such events but this would (1) require
us to store a stack of hook contexts to be resumed from. As the
resume_hook function could be interrupted indefinitely, an in-
finite amount of hook contexts would need to be reserved. (2)
The proactive_security_code is only valuable when executed
(completely) before the enclave context is resumed. Resuming this
function after it has been interrupted, only leads to performance
overheads. Both problems are resolved by ensuring that when
resume_hook’s execution is interrupted, its state is not stored but
the complete function is re-started from line 34. We achieve this
using a boolean variable in_hook to keep track whether we’re
currently executing the resume_hook function. Unfortunately re-
setting this variable after the enclave’s context has been restored is
infeasible. Alternatively, clearing the variable before restoring the
context causes the enclave_context to be overwritten when an
interrupt arrives between both instructions. We resolve this prob-
lem by adding another condition that tests whether the instruction
pointer points within the resume_hook function. Only when both
conditions indicate that we’re outside the resume_hook function,
will the enclave_context be overwritten (line 22).
3.2.2 Requirement 2: Unobservable Enclaved Execution. The in-
troduction of a block-eresume bit enables us to preload the TLB
after every enclave (re-)entry. Unfortunately, this is not sufficient
to defend against page-table-based attacks. When HyperThreading
is available and enabled, the TLB is shared between both logical
cores. Recent work [59] showed that an attacker may leverage this
design choice and evict TLB entries of the enclave while executing
on the other logical core.
1 ssa_t enclave_context;
2byte hook_stack[0x1000];
3bool in_hook;
4
5 sgx_status_t entry_point ecall_gen_otp( otp_t ∗otp ) {
6 ssa_t ∗ssa = ssa_stack.top();
7 ssa−>block_eresume = 1;
8 if ( proactive_security_code() != SGX_SUCCESS ) // e.g., preload_tlb()
9 return SGX_FAILED;
10 ∗otp = gen_otp();
11 ssa−>block_eresume = 0;
12 return SGX_SUCCESS;
13 }
14
15 sgx_status_t entry_point interrupt_handler( void ) {
16 ssa_t ∗ssa = ssa_stack.top().prev();
17 ssa_t hook_context;
18
19 if ( ssa−>block_eresume != 1 )
20 return SGX_FAILED;
21
22 if ( in_hook == 0 && in_resume_hook( ssa−>rip ) == 0 )
23 memcpy( &enclave_context, ssa, sizeof( ssa_t ) );
24
25 in_hook = 1;
26 hook_context.rip = &resume_hook;
27 hook_context.rsp = &hook_stack[0x1000];
28 memcpy( ssa, &hook_context, sizeof( ssa_t ) );
29 ssa−>block_eresume = 0;
30 return SGX_SUCCESS;
31 }
32
33void resume_hook( void ) {
34 ssa_t ∗ssa = ssa_stack.top();
35
36 ssa−>block_eresume = 1;
37
38 if ( proactive_security_code() != SGX_SUCCESS ) // e.g., preload_tlb()
39 simulate_aex();
40
41 in_hook = 0;
42 restore_from_context( &enclave_context );
43 }
Listing 1: By adding a block-eresume bit in SSA frames,
enclu[eresume] instructions can be easily intercepted.
Various options to avoid such situations exists: the TLB could
be split 50/50 between logical cores, the TLB eviction policy could
be changed, etc. Unfortunately, these changes would also affect
legacy code relying on this implementation. Therefore, we choose
another approach and verify that both logical cores have executed
a rendez_vous function and are still executing within the enclave.
To implement the approach, we rely only on the following hard-
ware modifications within SGX. First, an SGX enclave is able to
register for interrupts of the entire physical core. When Hyper-
Threading is enabled, interrupts, faults and traps are only received
by one of the logical cores. We update this behavior so that when
the other logical core is interrupted, this immediately results in
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an asynchronous enclave exit as well. Afterwards the interrupt is
handled as usual by the logical core it was send to.
Second, when the enclave on the other logical core executes an
enclu[eexit] instruction, the enclave should experience an AEX.
Finally, the enclave is able to determine the id of the physical core
it is currently running on. The rdtscp instruction already returns
the id of the logical core it is executed on, but the instruction is
illegal in SGXv1. In SGXv2 it is unclear whether its results can be
spoofed by a hypervisor.
Listing 2 displays our protocol. As it needs to rendezvous with
the other logical core every time the enclave is (re-)entered, we
re-use the hooking feature of the previous section. In fact, Listing 2,
line 4 displays the code called at listing 1 lines 8 and 38.
As the first step, the rendez_vous protocol registers itself (line 13)
to receive an AEX whenever either logical core receives an inter-
rupt, trap or fault. When we also verify that both logical cores
execute within the same enclave, both will continue their enclaved
execution until one of them exits. When that happens, both will
(eventually) re-execute the rendez_vous function.
For convenience and according to standard practices in mutual
exclusion algorithms, we assume that the variable i always refers
to the logical core that the code is running on (i.e., 0 or 1). The
variable j refers to the other logical core (j = (i + 1) mod 2).
Our rendez-vous protocol works by having both logical cores
write the id of their physical core to two shared variables id[i] and
id[j]. When both match they execute within the same enclave and
on the same physical core. A mutex lock prevents concurrent access
by both logical cores. But care needs to be taken. The hooking mech-
anism of Listing 1 only ensures that the code will be re-executed
after an interrupt. The value of shared variables (e.g., id) are left
unchanged and may be stale. Similarly, once a lock is taken, it may
not be released again.
We resolve this locking problem by recording who currently
holds the lock; the logical core requesting the lock (i.e., i), the other
logical (i.e., j), or whether the lock is free (i.e., -1). To take the lock
we use a compare and exchange instruction bool cmpxchg(&lock,
v, w). This hardware instruction is readily available in x86 pro-
cessors. It guarantees that true is returned and the value of the
lock changed to w iff lock has the current value v. Otherwise the
value of the lock remains unchanged. The instruction is guaranteed
to operate atomically. Listing 2 line 17 ensures that a lock is only
taken when it is free or the logical core already received it.
Once the lock is taken, we erase the physical id recorded by
the other logical core (i.e., id[j]) and set our own identifier (i.e.,
id[i]) in lines 21 and 24. As long as the other logical core does not
catch up and records its physical id – possibly for the second time
– we enter a wait loop (lines 15 and 26). Finally we check whether
both logical cores execute on the same physical core (line 27).
The protocol works by always first erasing the physical id of the
other logical core in the first iteration of the for loop. All other
iterations, its own physical id is (re-)written to id[i]. This implies
that when the conditions on line 26 evaluates to true, the logical
core j must have executed after the id[j] was erased. As this is set
only within the rendez_vous function at line 24, both logical cores
are executing within the enclave and at the same time.
1 shared int mutex = −1;
2 shared int id[2] = {−1, −1};
3
4 sgx_status_t proactive_security_code( void ) {
5 if ( rendez_vous() != SGX_SUCCESS )
6 return SGX_FAILED;
7 preload_tlb();
8 return SGX_SUCCESS;
9 }
10
11 sgx_status_t rendez_vous( void ) {
12 // register for interrupt/abort of this physical core
13 register_interrupt( read_physical_core_id() );
14
15 for ( int iteration = 0; true; ) { // busy waiting for rendez−vous
16 // take free or already owned lock
17 while( !cmpxchg( &mutex, −1, i ) && !cmpxchg( &mutex, i, i ) ){}
18
19 switch ( iteration ) {
20 case 0:
21 id[j] = −1; // always erase the other one's variables
22 ++iteration;
23 default:
24 id[i] = read_physical_core_id();
25
26 if ( id[j] != −1 ) { // wait for other core to catch up
27 if ( id[i] != id[j] ) {
28 mutex = −1;
29 return NOT_ON_SAME_PHYSICAL_CORE;
30 }
31 else
32 return RENDEZVOUS_SUCCESS;
33 }
34 }
35
36 mutex = −1; // release lock
37 } // end for−loop
38 }
Listing 2: Rendez-vous protocol ensuring that both logical
cores have entered the same enclave.
3.3 Heisenberg-SW: A Software-Only Approach
While Heisenberg-HW only relies on very limited hardware modifi-
cations, they are not yet readily available. We build a software-only
version of our approach by relying on Intel TSX.
3.3.1 Requirement 1: Hooking libheisenberg-SW. The use of
Intel TSX is straightforward. When we issue an xbegin a instruc-
tion, a new transaction is started. From then on all memory accesses
remain within the processor’s cache, hidden from other actors on
the platform. Upon a memory conflict, interrupt, etc. the transac-
tion is aborted, intermediate results are discarded from the cache
and execution is resumed from memory location a. Only when an
xend instruction is executed, is the current transaction committed.
Consider listing 3 line 11. In this code snippet the xbegin in-
struction is wrapped in a function. When the rtm_begin function
is called, a new transaction is started and the value 0 is returned.
However, when the transaction is aborted in the future, the entire
system state is rolled back and execution resumes from line 16.
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The application appears to have returned -1 immediately when
rtm_begin was called.
Hooking enclu[eresume]s. Transactions abort when an inter-
rupt or fault occurs. We use this feature to intercept enclave ex-
ecution flow after the enclu[eresume] was issued. We do so by
wrapping all confidentiality sensitive code executed by an enclave
in a transaction. Listing 3 displays an example of an enclave gener-
ating a one-time password. When the enclave is called to generate
a new password (listing 3, line 1), a new transaction is started. Next,
all security sensitive enclave pages are preloaded in the TLB, as
specified in Section 3.1. Afterwards normal enclave execution is
resumed and an OTP password is generated.
When an interrupt arrives, the transaction is aborted and the
enclave is exited immediately. Only after the interrupt is serviced, is
the enclave re-entered and the RTM transaction abort handler called
(listing 3, line 16). Eventually this leads to preloading all security
sensitive pages again and the re-execution of the entire transaction
(listing 3, line 2). Before the enclave returns to unprotected memory,
the transaction is committed.
To account that transactions are constrained both in space and
time, we commit intermediate results to main memory (line 21).
However, executing an xend and xbegin sequentially is not suffi-
cient. An attacker interrupting the newly started transaction, will
automatically flush the TLB. When the enclave eventually resumes
its execution, an attacker could again learn the enclave’s page ac-
cesses by monitoring its page table walks. We prevent such attacks
by forcing the pages to be preloaded again whenever a new trans-
action is started.
3.3.2 Requirement 2: Unobservable Enclaved Execution. Out of
the 189 SGX-capable processors released by Intel, 66 do not support
HyperThreading [30]. For these processors this requirement is ful-
filled automatically. For the others care needs to be taken to prevent
an attacker from evicting TLB entries from another core [59].
For processors that do support HyperThreading, preloading TLB
entries still significantly raises the bar for an attacker. As the TLBs
replacement policy has not yet been reversed engineered, leaking
enough information from a running enclave is non-trivial.
Stronger security guarantees can be provided by relying on se-
cure boot. At boot time PCR registers are extended with a measure-
ment of all code and configuration parameters the system booted
from. A secure channel can be set up between the enclave and the
TPM chips that holds the PCR registers. This enables enclaves to
verify that HyperThreading has been disabled. Setting up an au-
thenticated session with the TPM chip and reading PCR values is
estimated by related work at 72ms [56]. The performance can be
improved significantly by the introduction of a proxy enclave. As
HyperThreading cannot be re-enabled after the BIOS disabled it,
the proxy enclave could query the TPM chip only once per power
cycle. All other enclaves can set up a secure connection with the
proxy enclave to request the result of its last PCR reading.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented a prototype for both proposed defenses. As we
cannot modify x86 microcode, the Heisenberg-HW prototype as-
sumes a co-operating runtime that calls the interrupt_handler
1 sgx_status_t entry_point ecall_gen_otp( otp_t ∗otp ) {
2 while ( rtm_begin() == −1 )
3 ; // retry the transaction
4
5 preload_tlb();
6 ∗otp = gen_otp();
7 asm volatile ( "xend\n" );
8 return SGX_SUCCESS;
9 }
10
11 int rtm_begin( void ) {
12 int ret;
13 asm volatile ( " xbegin 1f"
14 " mov $0, %0"
15 "1:"
16 " mov $−1, %0"
17 : "r"(ret) :: );
18 return ret;
19 }
20
21void heisenberg_commit( void ) {
22 asm volatile ( "xend\n" );
23 while ( rtm_begin() == −1 )
24 ; // retry the transaction
25
26 preload_tlb();
27 }
Listing 3: Heisengberg-SW confidentiality sensitive enclave
code in RTM transactions and reuses the transaction abort
handler to intercept enclave resumes after interrupts.
enclave entrypoint whenever the enclave exits asynchronously.
While this cannot provide any security guarantees against a mali-
cious application or OS, it does enable us to run performance bench-
marks on existing hardware. We also modified the Intel sgx_sign
tool to store the enclave’s layout data (e.g., page access rights) in
enclave-protected read-only memory. sgx_edger8r was modified
to hook calls to the enclave. Outward calls to unprotected mem-
ory are hooked similarly. Table 1 displays the extend of our code
modifications.
The Heisenberg-SW does not rely on a co-operating runtime
system. At enclave compile-time, we wrap sensitive code in an TSX
transaction. There exists a delicate balance on the size of trans-
actions. Large transactions that are aborted (e.g., due to an inter-
rupt) will lead to the loss of a large amount of intermediate results
that will need to be re-computed. Smaller transactions reduce the
amount of results lost, but require that every enclave page is re-
visited whenever a new transaction is started. We implemented a
simple but effective heuristic that roughly keeps track of how many
instructions have been executed within the transaction. When a
certain limit is reached, the transaction is committed.
Our LLVM pass implementing the heuristic takes two arguments:
FUNC_SKP and INIT_CNTR. Instrumenting small functions would
make for a more accurate estimate, but the induced performance
overhead for such functions can be significant. Therefore we ignore
functions smaller than FUNC_SKP instructions (in LLVM’s IR lan-
guage). In larger functions runtime code is added to the function’s
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Lang. Vanilla Added Total
Heisenberg-HW
libheisenberg-hw
{
C
asm
- 102 102
- - 207 207
Heisenberg-SW
libheisenberg-sw
{
C
asm
- 243 243
- - 207 207
LLVM Pass C++ - 148 148
Shared library/tools modifications
sign_tool C++ 2,742 102 2,844
urts
{
cpp
asm
3,979 33 4,012
- 146 23 169
edger8r ML 1,615 38 1,653
Table 1: Code Sizes for libheisenberg-sw/hw and its compi-
lation and runtime support.
prologue. A global counter is used to track the number of LLVM
IR instructions that can still be executed within the current trans-
action. When the function is called, we decrement counter with
the size of the current function. When counter drops below zero,
the current transaction is committed, and a new one started. The
counter variable is reset to INIT_CNTR. A similar approach could
be applied to loops as well. Although this would provide better
estimates of the transaction size, it would also increase the number
of instructions on the enclave’s control flow. We decided not to
implement this heuristic.
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Operational Evaluation
It is paramount for any defense for Intel SGX not to limit system
software in its abilities to govern access to platform resources. Nei-
ther Heisenberg-SW nor Heisenberg-HW limit the untrusted kernel
or hypervisor from regaining execution control. At the moment an
interrupt is raised, enclaves immediately exit asynchronously.
In addition neither modify the behavior nor meaning of the
accessed and dirty bits in the page tables. Hence, system software
can still rely on these bits to manage EPC memory, including when
any optimization is implemented as proposed in Section 6. Enclaves
may require enclave pages to be present in EPC memory before any
enclaved computation is performed, but cannot cause deterioration
of the operation of other enclaves. System software remains in
charge and can opt to reduce CPU time for enclaves requiring
too much EPC memory. Commodity systems already take similar
defensive measures against applications consuming too much main
memory causing the system to start trashing. [19]
Finally Heisenberg-HW ensures that correctly written enclaves
do not get in a stuck-state under benign events. Once the enclave
is prevented from being resumed, it is up to the enclave writer to
ensure that this block can be undone. As by default SSA frames
are always resumable, a fixed size for the SSA stack can always
be found. Heisenberg-SW does not modify the hardware and thus
trivially fulfills this requirement.
5.2 Security Evaluation
Our Heisenberg defense relies on the fact that we can intercept
all enclave calls and resumes, and essentially “blind” an attacker
before executing security sensitive code. We distinguish between
platform and compilation considerations.
Platform Considerations. An attacker targeting an enclave pro-
tected with Heisenberg can attempt several types of attacks. Any
attack that relies on the interruption of the enclave will fail. After
preloading all enclave pages that may be used before security-
sensitive data is used in the enclave, no information leaves the
TLB. When an interrupt arrives, the enclave is exited, and the TLB
flushed automatically as specified by the SGX documentation. [32]
Attacks that rely on incorrect access rights or the inspection of
the page tables and/or its caches also fail: Pre-loading enclave pages
in the TLB guarantees that access rights have not been reduced
and their accessed and dirty bits are set. Until their entries are
evicted from the TLB, no accesses to the page tables in memory
will be made, avoiding information leaks. Information may leak to
an attacker during the TLB preloading phase, but as all pages are
accessed in a pre-determined order, no sensitive information leaks.
Finally all attacks during enclave execution are prevented. As no
information leaks after the TLB is preloaded, an attacker can only
attempt to flush entries. Several options exist. Instructions such as
move-to-cr3 and invlpg flush TLB entries directly, but can only
be executed on the same logical core as the affected TLB. Issuing
such instructions would thus first entail an interrupt to unprotected
(kernel) memory and no sensitive information can be learned.
Enclave pages could be evicted from EPC from another core. As
SGX already relies on the correctness of TLB entries during enclave
execution, such events could also affect the integrity of enclave
execution. To prevent such events, SGX hardware already ensures
that pages are evicted only after all affected logical cores received
an inter-processor-interrupt (IPI), flushing their TLB. [32, §38.5.3]
We also need to ensure that all preloaded page translations fit in
the TLB. For the Skylake microarchitecture [31, §2.1.3] 1,536 L2 TLB
entries are available on the physical core with an associativity of 12.
Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, the algorithm behind
this TLB entry assignment has not yet been reversed engineered.
However, given the locality principle, adjacent pages will most
likely be mapped to different TLB cache sets. We discuss the impact
of enclave and TLB sizes in detail in Section 6.
Enclave Considerations. Enclaved code also needs to avoid that
TLB entries are evicted inadvertently. Defensive measures need
to be taken during enclave development. First, we need to ensure
that after enclave pages are preloaded, no accesses to unprotected
memory are made. An attacker that can force another address
translation to be inserted in the TLB, may cause an enclave-page
entry to be evicted. Such events can be avoided by preloading TLB
entries after data is copied from unprotected memory to the enclave.
Second, in case of Heisenberg-SW we also need to consider
special instructions (e.g., enclu[egetkey]) that cause TSX trans-
actions to abort. At compilation-time we can detect such calls and
avoid that they reveal any sensitive information. For example by
buffering the enclave’s seal key during the first call to the enclave.
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Figure 3: Overhead of increasing enclave sizes per page type.
5.3 Performance Evaluation
We ran our experiments on a standard Dell Desktop equipped with
an Intel Skylake i7-6700 processor, 16 GiB RAM (no swap space)
and a SATA-connected SSD. During the benchmarks the machine
was connected on an ethernet network. We also disabled SpeedStep,
P-States, C-states and TurboBoost to get more stable benchmark
results.
5.3.1 Microbenchmarks.
Impact of Filling the TLB. To assess the impact of filling the
TLB, we created a dummy enclave with an empty enclave function.
We called the enclave 1,000 times and recorded the required time.
Next, we gradually increased the number of read-only, writable and
executable pages. The results are displayed in Figure 3.
As expected adding an executable page is the most costly at
0.030 µs per page. More surprising was that adding a read-only
page is with 0.008 µs/page more time-consuming than adding a
writable page (0.007 µs/page).
Unfortunately, when running the benchmark within a TSX trans-
action we see that when we added 316 additional data pages (to-
taling 325 pages), we reached a hard limit. To ensure that we have
write access to data pages, we need to read/write to every page.
This quickly consumes a large fraction of the transaction’s write
set. After adding 316 pages, insufficient space is left to execute
the microbenchmark. We discuss the impact of enclave sizes in
Section 6.
5.3.2 Macrobenchmarks.
Executing on an Idle System. Benchmarking applications that
wrap large code sizes in TSX transactions is challenging. Imple-
menting an application and measuring its median execution time
over a large number of runs, does not reliably indicate how the
application will perform in a real-life scenario. In Section B we will
show that performance is impacted by (1) whether the previous
unprot. Heisenberg-HW Heisenberg-SW
Benchmark time overhead # int. overhead # aborts # commits
Fibo 714.052ms -4.57% 173 22.54% 1,544, 2,019,273
SHA512 10.087µs 1.56% 0 -34.43% 0 5
Table 2: Microbenchmarks for Heisenberg-HW/-SW when
executing on an idle system.
transaction succeeded. Once a transaction succeeds, it is much more
likely to run to completion again. This favors standard benchmark
settings, but in practice an application may only be executed at
large time intervals. (2) What the load is on the system in a mul-
ticore processor, even when we reserve a core for our application
and offload IRQs.
Even though we acknowledge these shortcomings, we imple-
mented two benchmarks and execute them on a reserved (physical)
core. Table 2 displays the results. First, we implemented a small
enclave that recursively calculates the 40th Fibonacci number and
measured its performance over 100 runs. Executing the enclave
protected with Heisenberg-SW (INIT_CNTR=1,800, FUNC_SKP=1)
requires over 2 million intermediate commits leading to a per-
formance overhead of 22.54%. When protected with Heisenberg-
HW, the enclave was interrupted 173 times over a median time of
681.42ms. This resulted in a speedup of 4.57%. We suspect that by
preloading TLB-entries, the out-of-order execution engine performs
much better as pipeline stalls due to page-table walks are reduced.
While Shinde et al. [51] indicate that their SHA-512 implemen-
tation confines input-dependent memory accesses to a single page,
this may not always be the case. Linking additional code in the
same enclave, may spill memory accesses to adjacent pages. Nor is
this sufficient. Van Bulck et al. [12] show that even such enclaves
can be attacked successfully. As expected, protecting our SHA-512
implemenation ported from Arm Mbed [2] with Heisenberg-HW
finishes in only 10.24µs. In all 1,000 runs the execution was not in-
terrupted and overhead remains negligible with only 1.56%. When
protecting the enclave with Heisenberg-SW, performance improves
significantly (34.42%). Again we believe this is caused by the pro-
cessor’s cache replacement strategy that attempts not to abort TSX
transactions due to cache conflicts in the (processor-wide) L3 cache.
As transactions need to remain in all cache levels (i.e., the L3 cache
is inclusive) until completion and each SHA-512 invokation will
reference the same cache lines, it will suffer from very low cache
pressure. This is consistent with the results presented in Appen-
dix B §1. The Heisenberg-HW and unprotected enclave versions,
do not experience this favorable cache replacement strategy.
Executing under Realistic System Load. Wealso ported the FreeType
library version 2.5.3 to bare SGX hardware. The same version was
attacked by Xu [62] and proved too complex for Shinde et al. [51] to
defend against using a compiler-based defense. FreeType provides
a type setting service. In our benchmark, we type set “Hello World!”
under an 25° angle on a canvas of 640 by 480 pixels. Each pixel was
recorded as a single character.
With 109,046 lines of C code, this enclave has a considerable size.
As we also included the Arial font in the enclave, the overall enclave
size is also much larger with 439 pages in total. Unfortunately, this
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unprotected Heisenberg-HW Heisenberg-SW
System load time (in ms) time (in ms) overhead # re-entries time (in ms) overhead INIT_CNTR FUNC_SKP med aborts # commits
idle 1.247 1.256 0.66% 0 7.357 489.85% 1,100 6 5 2,240
idle 1.247 1.256 0.66% 0 4.978 299.11% 1,100 11 13 2,189
writes 1.249 1.261 0.96% 0 7.967 538.05% 1,100 6 166 2,240
writes 1.249 1.261 0.96% 0 5.826 366.52% 1,100 11 192 2,189
I/O stress 1.259 1.320 4.88% 0 9.180 629.16% 1,100 6 846 2,240
I/O stress 1.259 1.320 4.88% 0 6.238 395.46% 1,100 11 538 2,189
llvm 1.288 1.369 8.38 0 7.366 471.94% 1,100 6 9 2,240
llvm 1.288 1.369 8.38 0 41.826 3,147.39% 1,100 11 10,777 2,189
Table 3: Benchmark results for FreeType under various conditions and settings. Figures in bold shows Heisenberg-SW’s con-
figuration with the smallest overhead under the given system load.
proved to be too large for Heisenberg-SW. We could not write-
access all 107 data pages, and resorted to only read-accessing them.
The access rights of executable pages were verified correctly.
We tested 80 different Heisenberg-SW configurations on an idle
system with INIT_CNTR values ranging between 100 and 2,000
(steps of 100) and FUNC_SKP ranging between 1 and 16 (steps of
5). The best performing configuration of Heisenberg-SW resulted
in an overhead of 299.11% (INIT_CNTR=1,100, FUNC_SKP=11) with
2,189 intermediate commits (see Table 3).
As Intel TSX performance depends heavily on system load (see
Appendix B), we performed the same benchmark while the other
available cores were indefinitely writing to a 2 MiB buffer (“writes”),
performing disk accesses with the stress-tool and compiling the
llvm-3.9 compiler. Even though we reserved a physical core for
our benchmarks and interrupts were offloaded to another core, the
number of aborts skyrocketed from 13 (idle) to 10,777 (llvm). We
could not reduce overhead by searching for a better configuration
for Heisenberg-SW, with one notable execution. During llvm com-
pilation performance overhead could be reduced from 3,147% to
471% by also inlining functions larger than 6 LLVM IR LoCs instead
of 11. But as the median number of aborts also dropped from 10,777
to only 9, we expect this is caused by variations in system load.
Heisenberg-HW performs much better when tested under the
same system loads; overhead increased only from 0.66% to 8.38% as
more than 50% of enclave calls were not interrupted and did not
require pre-loading the TLB again. This strengthens our believe
that IRQs can be offloaded to different cores, but that this has only
limited impact for TSX transactions.
6 DISCUSSION: ENCLAVE SIZES
The root cause of Xu’s et al. [62] and related attacks [12, 59] is that
EPC memory is limited. In current implementations only 128 MiB
RAMmemory is reserved for SGX of which only 96 MiB can be allo-
cated to store enclaved code and data. Many SGX use cases remain
well below this limit, requiring only a few hundred kilobytes to a
few megabytes of EPC memory. This includes software implemen-
tations of hardware-based security solutions [29], security sensitive
parts of applications [38, 39, 53, 55], and enclaves that provide a
security service to untrusted applications [40, 54, 56].
When multiple small enclaves are present in the system 96 MiB
of EPC memory may not be sufficient. This is especially challenging
in a cloud setting where a hypervisor may virtualize EPC mem-
ory, oblivious to virtual machines running on top; a kernel cannot
guarantee that all enclave pages are present when an enclave is
entered or resumed. For previously proposed solutions [14, 50] such
conditions will trigger a false-positive conclusion that the enclave
is under attack. Heisenberg’s reactive approach handles such situ-
ations more gracefully. An enclave page that has been paged out
by the hypervisor will result in the page fault when the TLB is
pre-filled. After the enclave page is loaded back in EPC memory,
execution can be resumed safely.
In Skylake processors only 1,536 TLB entries [31] are available.
Enclaves larger than 6 MiB exceed this limit and their page address
translations cannot completely be preloaded. In such cases we must
resort to static analysis. Attackers observing the page table can only
learn enclave secrets when secret dependent page accesses occur.
But many pages are accessed independent of sensitive information.
Such page translations can be omitted during Heisenberg’s TLB
pre-loading phase. Gruss et al. [26] take such an approach to defend
against cache attacks. Note that TLB pressure would be reduced
512x when support for 2 MiB pages is added to SGX, avoiding any
need for static analysis.
Enclaves larger than 96 MiB are challenging. As they are always
partially paged out of EPC memory, they always reveal some in-
formation. Probabilistic defenses such as ASLR [48] handle such
situations gracefully, but only increase the bar for page-table-based
attacks slightly [12, 59, 62]. We propose two future research di-
rections. General-purpose solutions for large enclaves could apply
mechanisms from oblivious RAM (ORAM) implementations to hide
page accesses, not individual memory accesses. Liu et al. [37] pro-
pose an interesting technique by applying “scratchpad” memory
that cannot be observed by an attacker. Heisenberg could provide
scratchpad memory whose page accesses are oblivious to an at-
tacker.
Alternatively, special-purpose solutions can be applied. Fuhry et al. [23]
consider the problem of enclaves that search in a huge data set and
need to hide access patterns to their search tree. Their solution
places the integrity and confidentiality protected search tree in
unprotected memory. An attacker observing accesses to this tree
will not learn any information. Such solutions still require that page
accesses of the enclave itself are oblivious to an attacker.
7 RELATEDWORK
Academic researchers have been proposing protected-module archi-
tectures for a long time [39, 53]. Surprisingly page-table-based side
channels against such architectures have only been described [12,
59, 62] recently. However, some early designs are not vulnerable
to such attacks as they set up their own page tables [39], avoid
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that page tables can be monitored [55, 61] or simply because the
targeted platforms do not provide virtual memory [8, 34, 43].
In Intel SGX page-table-based side channels cannot easily be
avoided. As it also tries to defend against potentiallymalicious cloud
providers [5, 11, 46], it cannot rely on a more privileged software
layer such as a hypervisor. At the same time, it still wants to enable
system software to govern platform resources such as EPC memory.
Designs where enclave pages are locked in main memory [22]
or where enclaves rely on referencing physical memory directly
without a hypervisor controlling guest-physical to host-physical
address page tables [18, 21], are not acceptable.
Shih et al. [50] propose in their NDSS’17 paper T-SGX, a reactive
defense mechanism that wraps enclave execution in TSX transac-
tions. When the same transaction is aborted more than 5 times, this
is seen as an attack and the enclave is destroyed.
Chen et al.[14] use a similar approach but rely on Intel TSX
in a separate enclave thread to construct a secure clock. The en-
claved program checks the secure clock during its execution. Any
significant deviation from the expected execution time, must have
originated from an asynchronous enclave exit (AEX). Once detected
a security policy can be implemented to determine whether the
system is under attack and how it should be addressed.
Both T-SGX as Déjà-Vu suffer from limitations inherent to re-
active defenses against page-table based side channels: (1) attacks
may use information leaks that can be observed without causing
enclave exits [12], (2) the absence of a page fault itself already leaks
information that a specific page is not required, (3) even under
benign conditions enclaves will be interrupted, (4) once an attack is
detected it is challenging to securely resume execution. In contrast,
Heisenberg is a proactive defense mechanism that avoids these
shortcomings (see Section 2.3).
At the SysTEX’16 workshop Völp et al. [58] proposed to enable
SGX enclaves to temporarily disable interrupts in order to execute
preparation code within the enclave. But this also requires a delicate
balance. A too short time frame would significantly limit the code
that can be executed atomically. A too large time frame limits
system software to handle interrupts in a timely manner and affects
fair scheduling of processes and virtual machines.
Other approaches rely heavily on rewriting software running in
enclaves. Shinde et al. [51] implement a compiler pass that forces
code to be page-fault oblivious: by adding dummy branches it is
ensured that all execution traces access the same pages in the same
order. It is assumed that once an enclave accesses a page, system
software can only revoke access after a page fault. Interrupts [12]
are not considered. The authors also acknowledge that their defense
technique cannot be applied when the enclaved application (e.g.,
the FreeType library) follows a too unbalanced execution tree.
Obfuscated enclave code make it harder to reconstruct or ana-
lyze control flow and also raises the bar for page-table based side-
channel attacks. Seo et al. [48] propose SGX-Shield, a fine-grained
ASLR mechanism [6] that randomizes 32 byte-sized execution units
within the enclave in order to defend against low-level attacks
against enclave code (e.g., ROP attacks [49]), Schuster et al.[46] ap-
ply another approach by loading and executing encrypted payloads.
Both approaches only provide limited protection as (1) the decryp-
tion and randomization process itself could be attacked [62], (2)
observing changes in page accesses given known enclave input/out-
put may reveal valuable information. For example an attacker tar-
geting the example of Section 2.1, may learn that a specific page is
accessed if and only if a specific disorder is detected, by analyzing
known DNA samples. Finally (3) publicly available libraries may
exert unique page access footprints, potentially revealing which
code is executing within the enclave. We investigate in future work.
Finally Intel suggests [33] to “align specific code and data blocks
to exist entirely within a single page.” The cryptographic commu-
nity goes even further and proposes to eliminate branches com-
pletely [16]. While such solutions may be feasible for specific soft-
ware, it is extremely hard for generic code and would lead to unac-
ceptable performance overheads.
Other related work tries to defend against other side channel
attacks. Gruss et al. [26] for example showed that TSX could be
used to cloak cache accesses by pre-loading data in transactions.
But similar to Heisenberg-SW, this approach may lead to significant
performance overhead or even non-termination when applied on
systems under heavy load. These disadvantages could be eliminated
when our proposed hardware modifications are adopted for systems
with an exclusive L3 cache (e.g., the Skylake-server architecture).
8 CONCLUSION
We presented Heisenberg, a proactive defense mechanism that pro-
vides complete protection to enclaves against page-table based side
channels. Heisenberg verifies and preloads enclave page transla-
tions before confidentiality-sensitive code is executed. This enables
it to (1) protect against even the most novel page-table based attacks
and (2) avoids the shortcomings of reactive defenses.
We evaluated two implementations. Heisenberg-SW uses Intel
TSX and can be readily applied on platforms lacking HyperThread-
ing support (35% of all SGX-capable processors). Platforms with
HyperThreading support can rely on PCR registers to determine
whether HyperThreading has been properly disabled in the BIOS.
We showed that Intel TSX can lead to huge performance over-
head or even non-termination when applied to hook enclave re-
sumes. This makes any defense mechanism using Intel TSX in such
a way a short-term solution. Heisenberg-HW relies on very limited
hardware modifications to avoid these shortcomings.
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A BACKGROUND: INTEL SOFTWARE GUARD
EXTENSIONS
Some notable design decisions were made for Intel SGX to co-
operate seamlessly with legacy operating systems. We introduce
important aspects here, but refer the reader to the Intel Manuals [32]
and other documentation [1, 29, 41] for more details.
Basic Operation. From a high overview, Intel SGX relies on two
key properties: a program-counter-based access control mechanism
and key derivation. After modules are created, access rights change
according to the currently executing instruction. Software running
outside the enclave – at any privilege level – cannot access the
enclave’s memory region in any way. Only predefined entry points
can be called. As these entry points are located within the enclave,
memory regions within the enclave become accessible. To enable
enclaves to integrate easily in OS processes, and to pass data to and
from the enclave, (untrusted) process memory remains accessible.
This enclave isolation mechanism is only enforced after the en-
clave has been properly initialized. This opens up a small window of
opportunity for an attacker to modify the enclave when it is created.
SGX’ key derivation mechanism mitigates such attacks. At creation
time, a unique set of keys is derived based on a platform secret and
the initial state of the enclave. Any modification during set-up, will
lead to different cryptographic keys. This will prevent an attacker
from (1) accessing sensitive data that was stored confidentiality and
integrity protected by a previous, genuine enclave and (2) attesting
the execution of the modified enclave to a third party.
Untrusted Page Tables. SGX enclaves execute in the same address
space as their process. This enables easy development of enclaves
as data passed to and from enclaves does not need to be marshaled.
By simply passing a pointer to unprotected memory, the enclave
itself can directly read and write in- and output.
Even though the correct mapping of virtual enclave pages to
physical memory is paramount for security, the address translation
units remain untrusted. Instead SGX applies a use-but-verify ap-
proach. The untrusted legacy kernel remains in charge of creating
the segmentation and page tables, but the SGX hardware checks
whether this mapping is correct.
When an logical address is referenced by a process, it is first
passed through the segmentation unit. As in x86 64-bit mode the
base addresses and limits for segments %CS, %DS, %SS and %ES
are enforced to be set to 0x00000000 and 264 − 1 respectively, no
additional checks are performed.
After the segmentation unit returned a linear address, it is passed
through the paging unit. There the linear address is first located in
the translation look-aside buffer (TLB). If it is not found there, the
page tables (and extended page tables, when present) are walked
until a physical address is found eventually. Additional checks now
need to be performed. An attacker in control of the untrusted page
tables, must not be able to map enclave pages to incorrect physical
memory or disable protection bits (e.g., W-xor-X prevention). SGX
facilitates this verification by dividing SGX reserved memory into
an enclave page cache (EPC) and an enclave page cache map (EPCM).
Each 4 KiB page in EPC memory has a unique entry in the EPCM
that keeps track of the validity of the page, its type, a reference
to which enclave it belongs to and so on. For regular pages it also
keeps track of their linear addresses they are supposed to bemapped
on and their access rights. After the page table walk resulted in a
physical location in EPC memory, its related EPCM entry is fetched.
When the metadata stored there matches with the translation of
the page table unit, the linear-to-physical mapping is added to the
TLB. To ensure that the translations in the TLB remain up to date,
the TLB is flushed automatically upon every enclave entry and exit.
Enclave Page Eviction. Intel SGX does not only protect sensitive
enclaved information from attackers who infiltrated at any privilege
level (kernel, hypervisor, etc.). It also protects against coldboot
attacks [28] and attackers snooping the memory bus. A hardware
encryption engine ensures that enclave memory is only available
in plaintext when it resides in one of the CPU’s caches. Before it is
sent to main memory, it is on the fly confidentiality, integrity and
version protected by the encryption engine. By statically allocating
EPC/EPCM memory as a contiguous physical memory region of
typically 128 MB, the implementation of the encryption engine
becomes manageable.
Unfortunately, this construct places a hard limit on the amount
of protected memory. The overall demand for SGX memory may
be much larger, especially in a cloud setting where multiple clients
wish to execute enclaves at the same time in their own virtual
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Figure 4: Test results of the size of RTM’s read and write set.
machines. The EPC/EPCM structures also play an important role
here. Special instructions are available to system software to swap
EPC pages in/out. A similar use-but-verify approach as for address
translation is used: system software selects which EPC page needs
to be evicted from EPC memory and manages the swap space. SGX
hardware ensures that these pages are properly protected before
leaving EPC memory and that the necessary checks are performed
when they are swapped back in.
Interrupts. To ensure that system software remains in control
over the platform, it is also paramount that malicious or badly-
behaving enclaves can be interrupted at any moment in time. To
prevent that sensitive information may leak through such inter-
rupts, a stack of State Save Area (SSA) frames need to be reserved
at enclave creation time. When an interrupt is received, registers
are stored in the top frame of the SSA stack. Registers are then
cleared and a dummy interrupt frame is pushed on the unprotected
interrupt stack of the kernel. When the operating system has ser-
viced the interrupt, a legacy “return-from-interrupt” instruction
(iret) is issued. This will result in the implicit calling to a resume-
from-enclave-interrupt-handler in the untrusted application. It is
this untrusted handler that will issue the SGX enclu[eresume]
instruction. Unlike legacy iret instructions, an enclu[eresume]
will restore the entire processor state from the top SSA frame. It is
not possible to register an interrupt handler within the enclave.
B TSX BEHAVIOR UNDER SYSTEM LOAD
Intel TSX has been proposed to avoid the communication overhead
originating from taking explicit locks in multithreaded applica-
tions. Unfortunately Intel TSX cannot guarantee that transactions
will ever be committed. To avoid such situations developers are
urged [31] to fall back on explicit synchronization locks when trans-
actions frequently abort. Unfortunately, this is infeasible when ap-
plied to hook SGX resumes [50]. We analyze Intel TSX’ limitations.
RTMTransaction Size. Transactions are constrained both in space
and time. Transactions are aborted when their read or write set
grow too large to be tracked or when an interrupt occurs. To assess
their maximum practical size, we wrote small test programs. One
version allocates a small buffer and transactionally fills it. When this
transaction succeeds, we immediately attempt the same operation
again and record the chances of this second transaction succeeding
immediately. Another version implements the same test, but waits
1 second between transactions.
Figure 4a displays the results. When the second transactions are
started immediately and the write buffer is smaller than 28 KiB,
the success rate of second transaction is higher than 90%. After the
30.5 KiB limit is reached, all transactions fail. When we introduce a
cool down period of 1 second between transactions, success rates
remain close to 100% for buffers smaller than 23 KiB, but drop
sharply afterwards.
We performed the same test for read instructions. Transactions’
read set is tracked in L1 as well, but cache line evictions “may not
always result in an immediate transactional abort since these cache
lines may be tracked in an implementation-specific second level
structure.” [31, §12.2.4.2] Our results (see Figure 4b) show indeed
such behavior with transactions quickly surpassing the L1 cache
size. When the buffer grows larger than 2,080 KiB, we again see a
big impact of the cool down period.
We suspect that the impact of the cool down period originates
from other processes occupying the same cache lines. Processes on
other physical cores compete for the (inclusive) L3 cache. Processes
running on the other logical core of a HyperThread-enabled pro-
cessor, compete for the L2 cache as well. We suspect that when our
benchmark tries to access a cache line that would cause a cache
line to be evicted from another logical or physical core in L3, the
entire transaction is aborted.
Transaction Aborts due to Interrupts. We wrote a small bench-
mark to assess the impact of system load on TSX transactions.
Our benchmark starts a new transaction and immediately enters a
while(1)-loop. We execute the benchmark on a reserved (physical)
core and offload the IRQ interrupts2 to another core. For a 1,000
second period, we track how many aborts are encountered per
second and their cause. Unfortunately Intel TSX does only signals a
transaction abort when an interrupt arrives. Therefore we assume
all aborts without an explicitly reported cause, are due to interrupts.
Next, we filter out all non-interrupt related transaction aborts and
display the result in Figure 5a. When the system is running idle,
980 transaction abort per second (median). When the system comes
under heavy load, this number increases significantly. When we
instruct the other remaining logical cores to indefinitely write to
a 2 MiB buffer, 12,854 transactions were interrupted per second.
Performing disk intensive loads using the stress tool on the re-
maining available logical cores increases the transaction interrupts
per second to 20,282. Finally we tested the system under a more re-
alistic load and build the llvm 3.9 compiler on the remaining logical
cores. This led to a significant increase of 79,067 transaction inter-
rupts per second due to interrupts. When we slightly modify our
benchmark to first read a 4 KiB buffer before entering the endless
loop, we received almost the exact same results. This strengthens
our assumption that the transactions were indeed aborted due to
interrupts.
Transaction Aborts due to Cache Conflicts. Using the same results
of the previous benchmarks, we also look into the number of aborts
solely caused by cache conflicts. Results are displayed in Figures 5c
2 We validated our setup by executing watch -n1 -d "cat /proc/interrupts" and
watching interrupts being registered on each core.
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(a) Executing while(1){} in a transaction on a reserved core still
experiences a large number of interrupts when the system be-
comes under heavy load.
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(b) Reading 4KiB in a transaction on a reserved core does not im-
pact the number of interrupts when the system becomes under
heavy load.
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(c) Executing while(1){} in a transaction on a reserved core re-
sults in many more cache conflicts when the system comes un-
der heavy load than an idle system.
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(d) Reading 4 KiB in a transaction significantly increases the
chances of memory conflicts when the system comes under
heavy load, even when executing on a reserved core.
Figure 5: The number of TSX transaction aborts encountered depends heavily on system load. The graphs display the number
of interrupts (Fig. 5a and 5b) and memory conflicts (Fig. 5c and 5d) per second under the given system load. All tests were
performed on an otherwise reserved core. IRQs were also handled by other cores.
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and 5d. Note the change of scale of the vertical axes. As expected,
less than 44 (median) transaction aborts per second were caused by
cache conflicts when we run the first benchmark on an idle system,
or under I/O stress. When the other cores write to a 2 MiB buffer,
the number of aborts due to cache conflicts increase to 67. While
this load is memory intensive, only a small part of the cache is
used. In addition the benchmark only uses a very small amount
of stack memory to call the rtm_begin function (listing 3 line 11),
which explains the modest amount of cache conflicts. Compiling
the LLVM compiler on the other hand uses many more cache lines,
which results in many more transaction aborts per second (27,913
aborts/s). As expected, reading a 4 KiB buffer before entering the
endless loop, increases the likelihood of memory conflicts.
Conclusion. Our benchmarks show that when the system comes
under heavy load, chances of transaction aborts increase signifi-
cantly, even when executing on an isolated (physical) core and
interrupts are offloaded to another core. This has significant impact
on all defense mechanism relying on Intel TSX to hook enclave
enclu[eresume] instructions.
First, it shows that forcing an operating system or hypervisor
to guarantee that a certain transaction abort limit is not exceeded,
is extremely difficult. The entire system load needs to be taken
into account, not just load running on a specific core. This has a
detrimental effect on reactive defense mechanisms that attempt to
detect ongoing attacks based on an unusual amount of transaction
aborts.
Second, as transaction aborts depend heavily on system load,
wrapping sensitive operations in a transaction is challenging. Split-
ting the operation in small transactions will lead to significant
performance overhead. But too large operations may never termi-
nate when the system is under heavy load. This makes any solution
relying on Intel TSX to hook enclave resumes, only a short-term
solution.
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